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Solution Strategy

The Connected Trade Network solves the container-transport data-sharing challenge by introducing a single, verifiable identity layer (the Association Register) and a standard way to register endpoints so that data providers and consumers can discover and authenticate each other without bespoke bilateral integration. Authorisation stays where the data already lives: each provider decides locally — on the basis of the verified identity — whether the request is allowed. The 2026 delivery sticks to this minimum so participants can start exchanging operational data quickly; broader components (orchestrator-bound registers, dossier-level proof of involvement, full PKI federation) are deliberately deferred to later phases.

CTN is a specific implementation of the Basic Data Infrastructure (BDI) framework for the container-transport domain. BDI provides the principles and patterns for sovereign data exchange between organisations; CTN applies them to container-transport coordination.

Key BDI Foundations Used by CTN:

  • Association-Based Model: container-transport associations onboard participants and manage compliance.
  • Digital Trust Framework: identity management and access control using OAuth 2.0 and signed JWTs.
  • Event-Driven Communication: real-time notifications of operational changes (subscribe-and-receive from the source).
  • Zero Trust Security: continuous verification; no implicit trust.
  • Data Sovereignty: data remains with the provider, accessed through controlled interfaces.
  • Federative Architecture: distributed governance, no central data repository.

For complete BDI framework specifications, see BDI Framework Principles.

1. The Association Register (ASR) is the foundation

Section titled “1. The Association Register (ASR) is the foundation”

Decision: The 2026 delivery is built around a production-ready ASR. Everything else hangs off it.

Rationale:

  • Identity and discovery are the prerequisites for any other CTN capability. Until parties can find each other and verify each other, no data product matters.
  • A single source of truth for participant status (active, suspended, re-verified, off-boarded) avoids the bilateral re-verification overhead that today slows onboarding.

Implementation:

  • Self-service onboarding with eHerkenning-based authentication of authorised representatives.
  • Automated checks against KvK, KBO, VIES and GLEIF; re-verification at least annually, quarterly where risk requires.
  • Issuance of VAD tokens (JWS-signed JWTs) and M2M OAuth client credentials.
  • JWKS endpoint for public-key discovery.

2. Endpoint registration over bespoke integration

Section titled “2. Endpoint registration over bespoke integration”

Decision: Data providers register their endpoints in the ASR (OpenAPI spec + metadata); data consumers register their applications and obtain credentials. The ASR validates and publishes both sides; consumers and providers find each other through the discovery API.

Rationale:

  • Removes the N×M integration cost that today blocks adoption of new data products.
  • Makes data products discoverable across the network at a single well-known location.
  • Standardises authentication: one OAuth client-credentials flow regardless of provider.

3. Local authorisation at the data provider

Section titled “3. Local authorisation at the data provider”

Decision: CTN does not run a central policy decision point. Each data provider validates the VAD and applies its own policy locally.

Rationale:

  • Keeps the data owner in control of every release decision.
  • Avoids a central rule engine that everyone would have to trust to enforce their policies correctly.
  • Aligns with BDI principles 5 (Data at the Source) and 6 (Local Decision-Making).

4. Use case first: Visibility Achterland Containerlogistiek

Section titled “4. Use case first: Visibility Achterland Containerlogistiek”

Decision: The first practical case combines Portbase data with inland-terminal operational data into one dashboard for import containers moving over barge into the hinterland.

Rationale:

  • Low operational risk — no intervention in primary terminal processes.
  • Touches the parties that benefit most from end-to-end visibility (terminals, barge operators, BCOs, forwarders).
  • Reuses the same plumbing (ASR + endpoint registration + OAuth) that subsequent use cases will need; the next use case is mostly endpoint registration.

5. Phased delivery; defer the heavyweight components

Section titled “5. Phased delivery; defer the heavyweight components”

Decision: Orchestration Register, dossier-level authorisation, dual-token validation, an OPA-based policy engine, and full PKI federation are deferred to later phases. See the Implementation Roadmap. Design notes for those components are parked under docs/_out-of-scope-2026/ (gitignored) until they are needed.

Rationale:

  • Smaller blast radius for the 2026 delivery; clear win condition for the delivery team.
  • Avoids forcing every participant to operate components they do not yet need.
  • Lets the architecture grow when adoption justifies it, not before.

Concrete vendor and product choices are kept out of this document where possible; the Constraints chapter lists the binding choices, and the Deployment View lists the deployed services. The cloud-agnostic intent is real: Azure is the reference implementation, but the architecture avoids constructs that cannot be expressed on AWS or a self-hosted equivalent.

CapabilityReference choiceNotes
OAuth / OIDC serverKeycloak (self-hosted)EU-controlled; supports client credentials, federation, SAML; integrates with eHerkenning.
DatabasePostgreSQL (managed)JSON support; ACID; portable across clouds.
API gatewayCloud-managed API gateway (e.g. Azure API Management)OAuth introspection, rate limiting.
Secret storeCloud-managed key vaultHSM-backed signing keys for VAD JWS.
Identifier enrichmentKvK API, KBO API, GLEIF, VIESSee Identifier Enrichment Architecture.
  • Transactional data: PostgreSQL for ACID guarantees (participant records, endpoint registrations, OAuth clients).
  • Audit logs: structured JSON to the cloud-provider’s log platform; export available for compliance use.
  • No central data lake: data products stay at the provider; CTN brokers identity and discovery, not data content.

Defence in depth:

  1. Network: private endpoints, WAF, TLS 1.3 only.
  2. Identity: OAuth 2.0 client credentials for M2M; eHerkenning for human authorised representatives.
  3. Application: JWS-signed JWT validation against JWKS; short-lived tokens.
  4. Data: encryption at rest (AES-256) and in transit.
  5. Monitoring: centralised audit log and threat detection.

Zero Trust: every request authenticated and authorised; no implicit trust between services.

  • OpenAPI 3.x: contract-first; required for endpoint registration.
  • REST: standard HTTP verbs; resource-oriented URLs.
  • Versioning: URL path versioning (/v1, /v2).
  • Pagination: cursor-based for large datasets.
  • Idempotency: safe retries on POST via idempotency keys.
  • Subscribe-and-receive at the source: consumers subscribe to provider events over the provider’s own webhook/event channel; CTN does not relay event payloads.
  • Circuit breaker: resilience for external calls.
  • Retry with backoff: transient failure handling.
  • Database optimisation: indexes, partitioning on participant ID.
  • Async processing for re-verification.
  • Connection pooling.
  • Horizontal scaling for stateless services.
  • Auto-scaling based on metrics.
  • Read replicas for the discovery API.
  • Health checks; proactive monitoring.
  • Graceful degradation: providers can keep operating on locally-cached VAD validation when the ASR is briefly unavailable (within token expiry window).
  • Idempotency for safe retries.
BDI PrincipleCTN Implementation (2026)
1. Physical-Digital ConnectionRegistered endpoints map physical transport events (gate-in/out, ETAs) to discoverable digital data products.
2. Event-Driven ArchitectureProvider-published events over standard webhooks; consumers subscribe at the source.
3. Zero TrustVAD-validated authorisation on every request; no implicit trust.
4. Dynamic DataData fetched on demand from the source; no central cached copy goes stale.
5. Data at SourceData providers retain ownership and control; CTN never relays data content.
6. Local Decision-MakingEach provider runs its own authorisation policy on validated VAD claims.
7. Coherent SecurityTLS 1.3, JWS-signed JWTs, OAuth client credentials, JWKS discovery, eHerkenning.
  • With other BDI Associations: standard OAuth 2.0 and JWT enable cross-association identity verification; the ASR exposes a JWKS endpoint and a discovery API that any BDI-compliant peer can query.
  • With other data spaces: standards-based protocols (OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, JWT) keep the door open to IDSA, GAIA-X, and similar initiatives. Common semantic models for logistics (e.g. DCSA standards) are reused where applicable.
RiskMitigation Strategy
Slow participant onboardingSelf-service flow with eHerkenning; automated registry checks; clear administrator workflow.
Endpoint quality varianceMandatory OpenAPI spec + automated validation; reachability check at registration.
Integration challengesOne standard auth flow; discovery API; reference connector.
Security breachesDefence in depth; continuous monitoring; periodic external pentest.
Vendor lock-inCloud-agnostic design; portable components (Keycloak, PostgreSQL).

Technical KPIs:

  • API response time <500ms (P95)
  • Token issuance <100ms
  • ASR availability >99.9%

Business KPIs:

  • Participant onboarding time <24 hours (happy path)
  • Endpoint registration (validate + publish) <10 minutes
  • Visibility use case live with the agreed set of inland terminals and barge operators

This solution strategy provides the architectural foundation for the 2026 delivery of the Connected Trade Network. Later-phase components are tracked in the Roadmap.

In samenwerking met

Connected Trade NetworkConclusionData in LogisticsContargoInland Terminals GroupVan Berkel